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Abstract
This paper addresses a core issue for the regulated utility: what are the risks taken by investors in or-
ganisations that supply a product whose supply is regulated? Prior research on returns of regulated water
supply and distribution companies in the United Kingdom concluded that regulation interacts significantly
with equity returns and that the systematic risk and hence required returns of water utilities equity were
low and decreasing over time (Buckland and Fraser, 2001). The current research analyses the returns on
securities issued by regulated water companies in the differently-regulated economies of the UK and the
USA, using data from 1976 to 2010. Mirroring the results from the 1990s, the results suggest that UK
regulators chronically overestimated the risks borne by investors in water utilities, resulting in lax pressure
on permitted returns and higher prices than are needed to provoke efficient supply. The analysis confirms
that there are striking differences between the regulatory risks and patterns of returns for water utilities in
the USA and the UK.
Keywords: Risk, Volatility and Regulation in Water Supply and Distribution: a comparison of
post-privatization UK and US water utilities
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G15
1. Introduction
US utilities are generally regulated by setting a permitted return on book equity during periodic rate
cases. The permitted rate is intended to deliver a fair return to investors for the risks of the activity which
they finance. In contrast, UK utilities have generally been regulated by price caps based on the RPI-X
principle (see, for example, Bernstein and Sappington, 1999). In establishing the level of X in the price
cap, the regulator must assess what revenue stream is required to provide adequate compensation for the
investment in the utility’s assets, considering the time and the risk involved in financing the utility. In either
system, such determination of the cost of capital critically affects the size of utilities’ customers’ bills: in the
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case of water, it has been estimated that a percentage point variation in the cost of capital might translate
into a change of GBP9.50 in the average annual household bill (Ofwat, 1999: 124).
Three issues concern us in this paper. Firstly, does the riskiness of the water sector correspond to
regulators’ analyses? Secondly, does (systematic) risk vary over time, as has been found in prior research,
and is any change over time endogenous with regulation itself? Thirdly, how does the risk of UK network
utilities correspond to that of parallel utilities in the USA? We open with a review of the literature in
§(2) followed in §(3) by a discussion of our approach, which estimates the equity betas of UK and US listed
companies in the water sector, using a robust, Recursive and Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (RIWLS)
approach. §(4) presents our results and analysis and §(5) concludes with the implications of our research
and the prospectus of further work.
2. Background and Related Literature
“Our equity beta of 0.9 at the 57.5% notional level of gearing derives from an asset beta of 0.4.”
Ofwat 2009, page 128
[TABLE A.1]
The UK regulator’s view of the risk of water companies is at variance with the estimates available from
various major financial service data providers, see Table A.1. This reflects longstanding dispute: throughout
the period since privatisation of UK water companies there has been active and prolonged debate about the
cost of capital. At privatisation of the 10 Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) in England and Wales
in 1989, government set the cost of capital at 7 per cent per annum (at 8.5 per cent for the water-only
companies). By 1991 the regulator was arguing for a range of 5 to 6 per cent after tax (Ofwat, 1991): this
rate was used in the determination of the new price cap for the 1994 Periodic Review (Ofwat, 1994). In the
1999 Periodic Review, the regulator shifted the cost of capital downwards once more, to a range of 4.25 to
5.2 per cent after taxes (Ofwat, 1997 and 1999). In the 2004 and 2009 determinations, Ofwat settled upon
4.5 per cent post-tax (Ofwat, 2004; 2009).
Estimation of the appropriate rate has been influenced by rival modelling strands of the Dividend Growth
Model (DGM) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The former was the preferred approach by
the water regulator in the early 1990s; latterly, the CAPM has gained ascendancy and has become insti-
tutionalised, through its use by consultants, by investigations of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(now the Competition Commission, but hereafter MMC) and by the various regulators in their price deter-
minations. Contemporary rival models, in particular the Arbitrage Pricing Theory or multi-factor models,
have attracted speculative comment, but have gained no allegiance with regulators.
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The CAPM has itself predominantly been discussed in terms of a fixed-coefficients model, used in mod-
eling a risk-adjusted periodic return. The debate has turned upon issues of (a) how systematically risky a
utility company’s regulated business is or will be; (b) what capital structure would be optimal for utilities
(and how risk premia on utilities’ corporate debt would behave under such structures); and (c) what the
levels of returns on riskless assets and on the market portfolio will be over the period to be regulated (Cooper
and Grout, 1993). Whether utilities’ equity risk is appropriately modeled in turn determines whether share-
holders’ returns are excessive.
Our first question affects the validity of any estimation of risk parameters that underpin a regulated
cost of capital and thus a price cap on the utility’s regulated business. Is an estimate of a utility’s beta,
over a period during which the underlying beta is either cyclical or is trended upwards or downwards, a
good or a poor basis for establishing the adequacy of returns to justify a price control? Critical academic
commentary has been predicated upon well behaved and non-trended beta estimates, but risk measurement
is increasingly recognised as problematic (Cooper and Grout, 1993, Robinson and Taylor, 1998, Cooper and
Currie, 1999; or Morana and Sawkins, 2000; Buckland and Fraser, 2001; Antoniou et al., 2000; Grout and
Zalewska, 2006; NERA, 2008).
The second question affects whether regulators are building in to their models the risk of the business
under regulated conditions, or rather the risk of such a business under the hypothetical conditions of compe-
tition. These concerns are first picked up by Dubin and Navarro (1982) and discussed further by Binder and
Norton (1999). In other words, are investors to earn returns justified in the absence of the market failure
which itself necessitates regulation, or rather the returns appropriate to a particular, regulated state?
Third, that latter issue will in turn affect how the risks and returns that are experienced in other regulated
regimes can be used as yardsticks within regulation elsewhere. For example, US utilities’ beta estimates
may be influenced by their regulation of returns rather than prices and by the short cycle of regulatory
review; while estimates of beta across RPI-X regulatory systems may be affected by the maturity of any
shift towards competitive product markets and by the duration and regularity of systems’ review cycles.
Perfect competition (many suppliers, symmetric information, costless entry and exit) excludes suppliers
from returns other than ’normal’ profits. Price-taker producers deliver services efficiently and consumers
benefit through price competition. Where market failure precludes competition, regulators may aim to
establish a regime that frequently and systematically claws back utilities’ efficiency gains. Such gains would
otherwise result in sustained ’abnormal’ profits to an unregulated monopolist and to temporary ’abnormal’
gains to a regulated utility, where price caps are binding and competitors are excluded. UK regulators seek
to deliver such gains to customers through periodic review of the price cap control. Thus regulators’ regimes
and behaviour interact with utilities’ riskiness. Such interaction may be asymmetric, with either a tendency
to claw back the abnormal profits to deliver lower prices (arguably driving up utilities’ cost of capital by
skewing expected returns downward), or a tendency to regulatory capture, with utilities protected against
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variation in shareholders’ returns by their ability to bank past gains and pass any downside risk through to
customers (thus driving the cost of capital downwards).
UK regulators have not explicitly considered interaction of regulation and beta estimation, despite a
recognition that estimates of low betas in US utilities may be affected by the rapid review cycle of capped
returns there. In the context of US rate regulation, however, analytical and empirical attention to the
interaction dates from the 1970s: see, for example, Breen and Lerner (1972), Leland (1974), Peltzman
(1976), or Thomadakis (1976). Early analyses of the interdependence of regulatory intervention and returns
variation were developed into models of risk-regulation linkages in the 1980s (see, for example, Thompson,
1979; Ahn and Thompson, 1989, Riddick, 1992, Llewellyn and Mauer, 1993; see also Bey, 1983; Bos and
Newbold, 1984). Accepting the stochastic nature of asset betas, these studies suggested that rate regulation
does reduce utilities’ systematic risk by significant amounts. For example, Riddick suggests that “average’
systematic risk can be driven to zero; in essence, regulation makes beta a random variable with a near-
zero mean’ (Riddick, 1992: 151). Llewellyn and Mauer argue that stabilisation mechanisms in incentive
regulation (rules which allocate unexpected returns between utilities’ shareholders and customers) will have
similar impact on measured riskiness (Llewellyn and Mauer (1993: 264). Structural linkage of risk and return
in US rate regulation is also discussed by Marshall et al (1981), Chen (1982), Prager (1989), Gombola and
Kahl (1990) and Teisberg (1993).
In the UK, attention was drawn to this issue by Gandolfi et al. (1996), who used the revealed volatility
of equity returns, as impounded into traded options price movements, to test a model of cyclical behaviour
of beta for the shares of UK regulated utilities. Their contention is that beta will follow a saw-tooth cycle
over periods of regulatory review, declining as review approaches, since in the review any systematically-
variable excess returns generated during the cycle period are impounded into the revised price cap. As cycle
periods and regulatory claw-back of excess returns accelerate, the measured (regulated) beta of the utility’s
equity declines in this framework, since product/service market risks are passed through to customers in
the tightening or loosening of price caps in the evolution of the regulatory regime. Attention has also
been drawn to risk : regulation interaction in the UK by Robinson and Taylor (1998), showing volatility
of returns for UK electricity utilities to be time-varying. Dnes et al. (1998) find a ’minor contribution’ of
regulatory announcements to utility share values. Antoniou and Pescotto (1997) suggest that regulatory
announcements impact upon the measured beta risk of a specific utility’s equity. Buckland and Fraser (2000;
2001) conclude that regulatory events are associated with changing systematic risk estimates in electricity
distribution and in water. Antoniou et al (2000), using VAR and GARCH procedures in decomposing risk
estimates during 1990 to 1995, conclude that regulatory uncertainty and unanticipated expectations revision
are important in utilities’ riskiness. Grout and Zalewska (2006) replicate this work and include comparison
with experience in non-UK utilities sectors. This paper sets out to further improve our understanding of
the links between regulation and the risks faced by the regulated.
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The UK regime is well documented in Buckland and Fraser (2001). For the US, the mechanisms of
regulation in water supply are clearly outlined in Beecher (2009) and will not be detailed further here. While
the sector is more fragmented and diverse in structure and regulatory authorities than is the UK, there are
common themes in the regulation of the (relatively few) private sector water utilities whose ownership is
securitized and listed (ibid, p5).
The water industry in England and Wales was privatised in 1990, by converting the then nationalised,
river basin boards into joint stock companies and selling their equity to the private sector through simul-
taneous initial public offerings on the London Stock Exchange. The value of and returns on the equity,
or risk capital investment in these companies is thus reflected in the behavior of the prices and yields of
their shares as quoted on the London Stock Exchange. We assume here that the exchange operates under
conditions of at worst semi-strong efficiency and that there are no issues of thin trading in the price and
yield data on these major companies. After privatisation, all WASCs have equities with closing prices and
yields determined by market forces in the London Stock Exchange. This generates objective, secondary data
on yields and returns.
In this paper, we construct our own estimates of the parameters of risk models, using daily closing
prices and dividend yields collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream database, from the date of first
dealings post-privatisation until December 31st 2010, or the latest date available, if earlier. The data is then
converted to daily returns for each company and also for the Financial Times Actuaries All-Share Index
(representing the UK ’market’) and the NYSE composite (representing the US market).
The data series for most privatised companies (Anglian Water, Northumbrian Water, North West Water,
Southern Water, South West Water, Thames Water, Welsh Water, Wessex Water and Yorkshire Water) are
affected by holding company changes over the sample period. Anglian Water equity was delisted in December
2006, when taken private by a private equity consortium, Osprey. Northumbrian Water was acquired by the
French concern Lyonnaise des Eaux in early 1996, then undertakings were transferred to the Suez group,
before its UK water interests were spun off into a consortium, prior to gaining a new listing as Northumbrian
Water Group on the London Stock Exchange in September 2003. Southern Water was acquired by Scottish
Power in 1997 and South West Water was renamed Pennon Group in 1998. Thames Water was acquired by
the RWE multi-utility in 2001, then bought out by Kemble Water Limited in 2006, managed by the private
equity group Macquarie Capital. Wessex Water was acquired by the US company Enron Corporation in July
1998, then bought by YTL Power International in May 2002. Yorkshire Water becomes the Kelda Group
during 1999, before being delisted in February 2008, when taken private by the infrastructure fund Saltaire
Water. North West Water combined with the regional electricity company (REC) Norweb to form United
Utilities plc in 1996. A similar merger joined Welsh Water with the REC Swalec to form the multi-utility
Hyder plc. In 2000, however, Hyder sold the electricity distribution business to British Energy and the water
business was sold to US firm Western Power Distribution: later in 2000 the water business was transferred to
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Glas Cymru, a company limited by guarantee and unlisted. Both these multi-utilities are maintained within
the sample, the latter until its delisting in 2000; although we note that, post-merger, their equity betas
will reflect major elements of (regulated) activity in electricity distribution and supply. For United Utilities
and Hyder, the risk of the parents’ equity is impacted by two regulators: Ofwat for North West Water and
Welsh Water; Offer (later Ofgem) for the electricity supply and distribution activities of Norweb and Swalec.
Since Offer operates to different timetables and disclosure of regulatory review, one might expect that the
beta series for United Utilities and Hyder will be more complex than for solely regulated water businesses.
These shifts leave Severn Trent as the ever-present, alongside Pennon and the relisted Northumbrian as the
survivor listings to 2010, plus the various abbreviated listings of other companies.
Data on US listed water companies is collected in a similar manner from the Thomson-Reuters database,
from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 2010. We analyse data for the equity issued by the following compa-
nies in the US water sector that have active listings over the period 1976 to 2010: American States Water,
American Water, Aquarion, Aqua America, Artesian Resources, California Water, Connecticut Water, Con-
sumers Water, Dominguez Resources, Middlesex Water, Pennichuck, San Jose Water (SJW), Southwest
Water, United Water and York Water. 1
3. Data and Methodology
The theoretical foundation of this study is the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), where the return generating process on an asset is linear with respect
to a market benchmark. It is a stylised fact of empirical finance that the intercept and slope coefficients,
commonly referred to as betas (β) are not stable over time, with evidence on beta instability dating back
to the early 1970s (Blume, 1971, 1975; Gonedes, 1973; Meyers, 1973; Baesel, 1974; Bos and Newbold, 1984;
Black et al., 1992; and Gonzalez-Rivera, 1997). Additionally, there is evidence that betas are less stable
for individual securities than they are for portfolios: and that as the size of the portfolio increases, betas’
stability also increases, reflecting the effects of diversification (Alexander and Chervany, 1980).
In practice, numerous models have been used to estimate time-varying betas. These include: short-term
(usually five years) constant coefficient models; rolling regression and recursive regression techniques; and
time-varying coefficient models which specifically model the time-varying characteristics of the betas (see
Groenewold and Fraser (1999) for a review). Here we focus on a time-varying model and use the Kalman
Filter procedure for the maximum likelihood estimation of parameters of interest. The Kalman Filter utilises
a state:space model to extract and incorporate information from the conditional variance of prior returns in
1Several US water companies also have complex listings histories during our sample period (American Water, bought by
RWE ag in 2001 and spun off and relisted in 2008; Acquarion, bought by Suez sa in 2006; Consumers Water, bought by
Vivendi sa in 1998; Dominguez Resources, acquired by California Water in 1998; United Water, bought by Suez sa in 2001);
while data for one defunct utility company, Elizabethtown Water, taken over by Thames plc in 1999, is not available on the
Thomson-Reuters Datastream database.
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modeling the evolution of model parameters. It is a dynamic and recursive algorithm, where time-varying
parameters are allowed to be stochastic and which uses all available information in estimation, allowing for
shocks to the weighting process. This procedure has been applied to US data by Fisher and Kamin (1985),
to UK data by Black et al. (1992) and Buckland and Fraser (2000), to Swedish data by Wells (1994) and
to Australian data by Brooks et al. (1998) and Groenewold and Fraser (1999).
3.1. A Time Varying Coefficients Market Model
Consider the total return index RIi,t for the j
th asset from a complete market of n securities, with
capitalisation weighted total return index RIm,t. A dynamic representation of the standard linear market
model is
∆ log (RIj,t) = βj,t∆ log (RIm,t) + αj,t + ut (1)
where αj,t is the time varying expected excess return of asset j and βj,t is the systematic risk factor of
asset j with respect to the market, for notational simplicity the parameters are collected into a vector
bt = [αj,t, βj,t]
′
, for which the j asset indexation is presumed.
There are two main approaches for dealing with time varying coefficients models such as 1. First, one
can treat the vector bt as a vector stochastic process and implement a state-space type model. The simplest
method is to assume a vector random walk without drift, i.e. bt+1 = bt + vt, where vt ∼ N (0,Σ) is a vector
draw from a cross sectionally and serially uncorrelated normal random variable. The evolution of bt may
be estimated using a standard Kalman gain approach, maximising the joint likelihood of the observed and
unobserved state-space equations.
The motivation for the use of this estimator is that standard unscented Kalman filters have a tendency
to over ascribe variation in the state-space to the constant, resulting in high levels of variation between the
evolution of the estimates of the β coefficients for the cases when the intercept α is suppressed against the
unrestricted model. In most applications to estimating dynamic market models restricting α to zero should
not have a material impact on the β. A second issue is that sharp discontinuities in the slope and intercept
coefficients are often ascribed to higher levels of variation in the state vector, implying a higher level of
uncertainty in the results than is actually present.
To account for these issues we implement a robust alternative, which we have called recursive and
iteratively re-weighted least squares (RIWLS). In this approach we treat bt as an exogenous transmission
function estimated by a rolling or recursive least squares approach with linear or exponential forgetting.
Setting:
yt = ∆ log (RIi,t) , xt = ∆ log (RIm,t) , x˜t = [1, xt]
′
(2)
we additionally implement an recursively and iterated weighted least squares, the procedure is as follows.
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For a rolling window:
y˜t = [yt]
t
t−τ , X˜t = [x˜t]
t
t−τ (3)
the objective is to estimate:
y˜t = bˆ
′
tx˜t + uˆt, (4)
subject to the assumption that the history of the system is contaminated by the past history of alternative
βj,t and αj,t, i.e. that the transmission function is only locally stable. For an exponential forgetting factor
hˆ, the temporally weighted historical data vector/matrix are as follows,
Yt = y˜t ◦ ψy
∣∣∣hˆ , Xt = X˜t ◦Ψx ∣∣∣hˆ (5)
where τ = log(0.001) log−1(1− hˆ) is the lag order that covers the 99.9% mass of the exponential weighting.
The OLS estimate of the transmission function is therefore:
bˆolst = (X
′
tXt)
−1
X ′tYt (6)
this is then reweighted in the standard manner, by collecting the raw residuals
eˆolst = Yt −Xtbˆolst (7)
then computing and inverting the diagonalised outer product of the residual vector with itself,
Wˆ olst = idiag
(
diag
(
eˆolst eˆ
′ols
t
)−1)
(8)
the weighting matrix is then inserted into the estimation system,
bˆi=1,t =
(
X ′tWˆ
ols
t Xt
)−1
X ′tWˆ
ols
t Yt (9)
the process is repeated
bˆi+1,t =
(
X ′tWˆi,tXt
)−1
X ′tWˆi,tYt, eˆi,t = yt −Xtbˆi,t (10)
until the norm difference between the updated coefficients converges beyond an arbitrary critical value,
ςi+1 =
∣∣∣bˆi+1,t − bˆi,t∣∣∣ , bˆt = bˆi,t ∣∣ςi < ςcrit (11)
once the algorithm has computed estimates of bt over the whole sample, the overall model residuals are
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computed,
uˆt = y˜t − bˆ′tx˜t (12)
and the cumulative square error λ =
∑T
t=1 uˆ
2
t computed. The optimal bandwidth hˆ is computed by finding
the minimum cumulative squared error for pre-specified range of h. In this instance h is in effect a nuisance
parameter with a limited range of permissible values. We restrict h to be within the range of 0.7 to 0.95, in
keeping with the suggestion and results from Arvastson et al. (2000). In addition we have had to clean the
daily data and construct a matched set of returns to the benchmark to account for stale prices, a particular
issue with some of the US stock issuances. We utilise the Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2009) approach to dealing
with asynchronous updating of the quoted daily equity data.
4. Results and Analysis
Tables A.2 and A.3 present, for the UK and US respectively, the descriptive statistics of the daily returns
for the water companies in the sample. The mean, median and standard deviations of returns have been
annualized. In the case of the standard deviations the ‘rule of 16’ has been used to convert daily standard
deviations into annualised standard deviations.
[TABLES A.2 AND A.3 HERE]
The Figures A.1 to A.22 plot the estimated time-varying betas of the various water company equities
over the relevant estimation period. We consider, first, the behaviour of UK company betas.
Tables A.4 and A.5 summarise, for the UK and US respectively, the distributions of the time-varying
parameters of our models for beta and alpha over the duration of these utilities’ listing, ignoring the opening
‘training’ period of the estimation and any trailing period as data decays following suspension, acquisition
or delisting of the stocks.
[TABLES A.4 AND A.5 HERE]
Tables A.4 and A.5 detail the levels of betas and alphas estimated for the UK firms and US firms
respectively. Critically, we see both parameters as time-varying: and we report the features of their behaviour
over time in the following figures. For the UK, taking the only ever-present listing, of Severn-Trent Water
plc equity, two aspects are clear from the evidence, shown in Figure A.7. First, the equity beta of this
company lies below a level of 0.9 over almost the whole post-privatisation period: indeed, for the majority
of the time beta lies significantly below 0.7.
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Second, Severn-Trent beta trends downwards throughout the period of the second price cap regime, from
1995-2000. This is consistent with Buckland and Fraser (2001) and with the Gandolfi et al (1996) argument
that approaching review episodes will depress regulated companies’ betas (see also Grout and Zalewska,
2006 and NERA 2008, who argue for the ‘decoupling’ of regulated companies’ beta from the market’s risk
as review approaches). However, after an initial rise in early 2000 the beta then continues to decline, to
a level below 0.2, after the price review determination of 2000, before climbing in anticipation of the 2005
price review and climbing further and sharply in 2006 and 2007, prior to a halt at the onset of the credit
crunch in 2007.
[FIGURE A.7 HERE]
The standard error plot, in Figure A.23 , lends further, but only partial, support for the decoupling of
systematic risk as regulatory review approaches: standard error climbs sharply in advance of the price cap
reviews in 2000 and 2010: on the other hand, the regression gains explanatory power prior to the reviews of
1995 and especially of 2005.
[FIGURE A.23 HERE]
The other UK water companies offer similar evidence of the relatively low equity beta levels and of the
interaction of risk and regulation over segments of the post-privatization period. The plots of beta and the
regression intercept for Anglian (to end 2006), Welsh Water/Hyder (to 2000), for Kelda (to the beginning
of 2008) and Thames Water (to 2001) display similar behaviour, of both coefficients and standard errors of
regressions, as noted for Severn-Trent
Turning to US companies, we apply the same methodology of estimating the parameters of regression
of their returns as driven by the US market variability. Unlike the UK companies in this research, the
history of listing and market data on US water companies’ returns is more disparate, with several listings
from the early 1980s (Aqua America, Southwest Water), others from the late 1980s (Connecticut Water,
American States Water, California Water, Middlesex Water, York Water), or around the turn of the century
(Artesian Resources, Pennichuck); while American Water Works’ listing delivers data only until 2001 and
then from 2008 onwards. San Jose Water delivers an extensive history of data, but for several firms the
data from the 1980s is patchy and trading erratic. Several US data series exhibit these problems of thin
trading, which is dealt with here by measuring returns trade-to-trade, eliminating the occurrences of zero
returns and then matching to index returns measured over the same intervals, using the Barndorff-Nielson
et al. (2009) asynchronous returns approach.
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Additionally, it must be remembered that these US company equities are subject to a variety of regulatory
regimes (see Beecher, 2009). The host State regulator varies from company to company, with some multi-
State groups and others operating in a sole State. In one instance (Connecticut Water), the company
avoided regulatory rate cases for a 16 year period from 1992, having rates reset only in 2008, when a rate
case was finally brought. In several cases, the firm operates in multiple regulatory jurisdictions, a problem
not experienced in the UK context. However, all these firms are state-regulated (often, therefore, subject to
several regulatory commissions’ procedures, according to which states are served by their systems); and all
are regulated by periodic-reset rate-of-return regulatory regimes.
The contrast with UK companies is, therefore, stark: in the UK, a single regulator establishes a relatively
long-term regulatory environment, directed to permissible price caps that are projected to enable delivery
of financial viability and to incentivise operating and service efficiencies whose benefits can be arrogated by
shareholders. The 5-yearly review threatens to claw back cumulated efficiencies, deliver them to consumers
in a revised price-cap and reincentivise companies to further efficiencies and innovative practices. In the US,
by contrast, regulatees bid for a permitted rate and will return to reset their rate where they can argued
that it restricts their delivery of service and of quality.
Consider, then, the beta history of Aqua America revealed by our analysis and approach, as in Figure
A.14 below. From 1984 through to 2000 the equity beta lies around 0.2, almost decoupled from US market
risks. After 2001 estimated beta climbs significantly, peaking at some 1.2 in 2007 before falling back to
around 0.55.
[FIGURE A.14 HERE]
[FIGURE A.24 HERE]
Every US water equity in this investigation displays similar risk characteristics, particularly prior to
2007. the individual plots of estimated coefficients and their significance are annexed to the paper. For
example, Californian Water imposes no systematic risk on its investors throughout the period; and neither
do the equities of American States Water, Connecticut Water, Dominguez Resources, Middlesex, or San Jose
Water. American States Water briefly ‘spikes’ to a beta of 0.2 in 1998 (but this is barely significantly different
from zero). Aquarion’s beta varies around the 0.2 to 0.4 during its listing period. Artesian Resources’ beta
rises above zero only in late 2006, although it then trends upwards to a level around 0.6 late in 2010. Such
a late and significant trend towards positive beta in water equities is also evidenced by York Water. The
listing histories of American Water and of United Water suggest levels of beta that are comparable to UK
levels of the time: small but significantly positive, varying between 0.2 and 0.6.
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We draw attention to two special cases. One company, Pennichuck, is notable for the erratic progress
of the beta estimator over the period: moving between a low of less than -0.2 in 2002, to highs of over
0.4 in late 2000 and mid 2010. Pennichuck is interesting because its listing and this variability coincides
with a turbulent period of acquisition expectations. The period begins with an impending take over by
Aqua America, a move which was then frustrated by the action of Pennichuck’s host City, the City of
Nashua, in seeking to compulsory purchase Pennichuck’s assets under the rights of eminent domain. This
triggered a decade-long legal dispute between the company and the City over the value of the assets of
and control over Pennichuck. estimated beta climbs when the takeover is contested; it falls when news
indicates approaching agreement. A further US company, Southwest Water, displays a beta estimator that
is insignificantly different from zero until 2007, before exploding upwards to over 1.5. The rise here coincides
with revelation of serious misstatements of earnings by the company, resulting in Securities and Exchange
Commission action and a series of substantial accounting restatements, prior to the firm itself being taken
private and delisted in 2010.
We find, therefore, that the outturn levels of systematic risk in the equities of US listed water utilities
are low and are consistent with the broad expectations of the paper: investors have experienced systematic
risks that are appreciably lower than those used by US regulators in historic rate cases; and we find that
they are lower than the betas estimated for UK water utilities over the same period. There is evidence,
however, that systematic risk experienced by US and by UK investors in water stocks has increased since
2000. There are special circumstances to explain such increases in estimated beta for some firms. One
possible explanation for this may be the more febrile climate of anticipated acquisition activity, which was
prominent both in the UK markets of the mid-1990s and particularly in the US listed water sector around
the turn of the century. In the US there was significant attrition of listed firms in the years after 1998,
both by consolidation amongst the US listings and by a surge of interest from overseas multi-utilities groups
(RWE, Suez, Vivendi in particular): followed by a wave of interest, in both the UK and the US, from private
equity groups.
The expectation of the effects of regulation on utilities’ beta is that regulation will attenuate systematic
risks, by periodically capturing excess returns and sharing them in some manner with the consumer. As a
corollary, the US system, with relatively frequent resetting of rates of return in firm-specific and periodic
rate cases, is expected to deliver lower betas over time than the UK system, where prices are controlled in
five-yearly reviews and where investors can in the interim capture returns from innovation or performance
better than the expectations built into regulation. The comparative data of UK and US water utilities
presented here suggests that this is indeed the case. Particularly in the period up to 2000, beta esimates for
US water companies are less variable and closer to zero than is the case for the UK. Post-2000, the evidence
is less strong, with some - but not all - US utilities displaying significantly positive systematic risk. In both
countries, however, we find estimated betas that lie well below those built in to regulators’ decisions about
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the cost of capital and permitted returns on equity.
5. Conclusions
This paper considers, first, whether water utilities’ systematic risk is time-varying and, second, whether
the observed variation can be explained in terms of regulatory factors. Our investigation significantly
advances the modeling of the trace of beta and the regression intercept through time, employing a robust
econometric approach. The RIWLS procedure built in to this analysis obviates the need for adjustments
such as the Blume adjustment, routinely applied by commercial suppliers of beta estimates. While Blume
adjustments may be appropriate when the risks of underlying activity tend to the market risk level, there
is no evidence that they are appropriate when estimating betas where underlying risks are not unity. This
RIWLS approach obviates the need for ad hoc adjustments post-estimation. Instead, using daily data over
a sample period from 1976 through 2010 for the ten privatised water boards in the UK and for 14 US listed
water utilities, we establish that these utilities’ betas are not constant but are a function of time.
5.1. Implications of findings for water companies, for regulators and government
For the decade following privatisation, WASC betas declined. While never exhibiting the levels close to
unity utilised by the UK regulator, betas were significantly positive, although trending downwards towards
zero. Over the same period, US water utility betas were firmly established at or just above zero, with little
variation through time.
Since 2000, estimates of both UK and US water company betas have increased, in some cases significantly.
The remaining listed UK companies show equity betas of 0.5 (Northumbrian), 0.6 (Pennon) and 0.5 (Severn-
Trent). The latter two are estimated to have peaked at around 0.8 in 2007 before falling back.
The parallel changes in US water betas have been striking and stark: from levels around zero before 2000,
the peak year of 2007 has seen betas of 1.5 (American States Water), 1.2 (Aqua America), 0.7 (Artesian
Resources), 1.8 (California Water), 1 (Connecticut Water), 1.5 (Middlesex Water) and 1.7 (San Jose Water).
This phenomenon - if robust - deserves further analysis and explanation.
The reported results find strong support for the impact on systematic risk of regulatory review processes.
However, these do not appear to be wholly consistent with the standard explanation of a decoupling of
utilities’ beta as the regulator’s review approaches (NERA, 2008). While betas fall as the price cap reviews
of 2000 and 2010 approached, the opposite occurred prior to the 1995 and 2005 reviews. Further, betas
continue to fall after 2000, post-review. Our analysis does confound the conclusion in earlier research that
the betas of regulated water companies’ equities was declining towards zero, however (Buckland and Fraser,
2001). Instead, the equity betas of the remaining listed UK water utilities have risen, reverting to typical
levels of 0.5 to 0.6. It might appear that the low levels of beta around 2000 reflected a more general shift,
which has since reversed, from systematic to idiosyncratic risk, as noted by Black et al. (2002).
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The findings of this paper suggest, also, that the systematic risk of UK water companies, under the
regulatory process operated by Ofwat since privatization up to 2010, has stabilised into a pattern supporting
presumption that systematic risk in the UK’s regulated water industry produces equity betas significantly
below 0.7. The estimates here continue to suggest, therefore, that the UK regulator’s use of a range of 0.9
to 1.00 for the geared equity betas of the WASCs is significantly too high, with betas here clustered between
0.4 and 0.6 over an extended period of time. We note, here, that the robustness of the RIWLS framework
applied here implies that there is no case for adjusting estimates, a la Blume, or by other mechanisms. Thus
the cost of equity capital used in the 2009 review determinations may again be overly generous to the sector,
its shareholders and its management, giving scope for managerial slack, or for significant excess returns on
water companies’ equities over the review period 2010-2015.
A major innovation of this paper is the parallel investigation of the risk of US water utilities, subject
to different, rate of return cap regulatory regimes. We have strongly confirmed that the equity betas of
US regulated water companies are lower than those in their UK counterparts; and they can be considered
to have been zero before 2000. The estimates from this robust modeling demonstrate very clearly that
US investors in water utilities faced little or no systematic risk. This suggests, in turn, that the capital
structures and cost of capital for the US water sector might be expected to differ substantially from those
encountered in the UK.
However, there is strong evidence that several US water companies’ betas may have risen significantly
above zero in the period since 2007. The evidence is shared across companies and deserves more sustained
analysis in future years: it may reflect differences across states in the rate-setting processes in recent years,
or the impact of sector consolidation and merger and acquisition activity.
5.2. Future work
While we show stark differences in risk between UK and US companies in the same business activity,
for most water companies, the level of systematic risk borne by shareholders is very low. It would seem, for
example, that Pennon Group shares faced owners with levels of beta risk below 0.7 since 1992 and that their
asset beta lay below 0.2 in the second half of 1999. Our best estimates of betas confirm that UK regulators
systematically and repeatedly overstate the systematic riskiness of the entities being regulated: such that the
cost of capital is presumed to be higher than justified by post-regulation risks borne by investors and price
caps are thus loose. Further research is needed to disentangle the activity, financial, activity-diversification
and taxation effects that underlie the differences in beta for these essentially similar businesses. Further
research is also needed to determine whether the patterns of cyclical, mean-reverting, regulatory, political
and business risks are displayed by other utility sectors, where regulators, regulatory review procedures and
cycles and regulatory objectives may be different.
Contrasts with US water firms have been very valuable, reinforcing the differentials observed in earlier
14
research on the pre 2000 period (Grout and Zalewska, 2006). Given the disparate, state-based regulatory
practices and the paucity of examples of listing for both US and UK based water utilities, a closer un-
derstanding of the regulator’s procedures and practices is needed to untangle the reasons why investments
in water in the US were essentially riskless, but are now relatively risky; while in the UK they display
significantly positive systematic risk (albeit well below levels assumed by the UK regulator).
Finally, we would point out that the investigations and findings here, which are critical in establishing the
basis for regulatory intervention, are dependent upon the existence of long runs of market data on the risky
financial securities issued by regulated firms. This underlines the regulators’ interest in the maintenance
of listing and quotation for utilities’ equities, whose returns are derived as closely as possible from the
returns generated in the regulated activity. In the UK water industry, we are fortunate in the preservation
of quotation of some of the privatised WASCs for two decades after their creation and privatisation (albeit
that several have since been absorbed into multi-utilities, others have been absorbed into foreign-owned
and listed parent companies and others have been taken private by private equity groups, or, in the case of
Welsh Water, mutualised). In the USA, virtually all water companies are unlisted, whether they are public
enterprises or private companies (Beecher, 2009). When research turns in other papers to examination of
the behaviour of risk in other utilities, the degradation of market data by merger, acquisition and corporate
diversification will become more problematic.
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Appendix A. Figures and Tables
This is the complete annex of figures for the paper. The figures referenced specifically in the text above
are to be included in the paper. The remaining figures are provided as a resource in an internet appendix.
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Table A.1: List of active US and UK water companies, as of June 1, 2011 with the industry published measures of their betas
from two major financial data service providers.
Company Bloomberg Thomson-Reuters
British
Severn Trent 0.62 0.32
Northumbrian 0.65 0.19
Pennon 0.67 0.48
United Utilities 0.61 0.46
American
American States Water 0.38
American Water 0.60
Aqua American 0.23
Artesian 0.39
California Water 0.30
Connecticut Water 0.47
Middlesex 0.44
Pennichuck 0.35
Southwest Water
San Jose Water (SJW) 0.67
York 0.48
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